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Rapid ageing of the population globally represents an unprecedented historical trend. As 
pension and healthcare costs are positively correlated with rising incomes, ageing, 
urbanization, and a shift from communicable to life-style diseases, managing these costs is a 
major challenge. There are many linkages between healthcare and pension arrangements—in 
terms of costs, exposure to risks, and as they jointly impact on crucial policy decisions. This 
paper discusses the rationale for coordination between various programs to better manage the 
cost of ageing. The current difficult macroeconomic environment, including fiscal stringency 
conditions, strengthens the case for such coordination. 
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Many countries in Asia are experiencing rapidly ageing populations due to a combination of 
declining fertility rates and sustained advances in longevity. According to a United Nations 
forecast in 2010, both the pace of ageing and the share of the aged in the population are 
projected to exceed corresponding global rates between 2010 and 2030 (UNDESA 2010)1
Changing demographic profiles, along with advances in diagnostics and innovations in science 
and medical technology suggest greater resources will need to be devoted to managing the 
costs of ageing. However, as many countries in Asia are also ageing or are expected to age at 
relatively lower incomes, this portends significant challenges for governments across Asia to 
finance healthcare and pension expenditure. The rapid ageing of Asian economies has 
implications not just for financing healthcare and retirement expenditure for an increasing 
number of elderly people, but also for the broader economy and society, affecting for example 
employment and consumption patterns, technology generation and absorption capabilities, 
transport systems, and voting patterns (Roy and Punhani 2010). 
. In 
2010, Asia accounted for 54.4% of the global total of those above 60 years of age, and this is 
projected to increase to 59.9% by 2030. It is clear, therefore, that Asia will have a significant 
impact on the dynamics of global demographic trends.  
This paper has a narrower focus. It explores the rationale for coordination in healthcare and 
pension arrangements with a view to minimizing the total resource costs devoted to managing 
the costs of ageing. This issue has received relatively limited attention in the literature, and as 
such this should be regarded as an exploratory study. It should be emphasized that 
coordination is not harmonization. The underlying economic, financial, and actuarial analytics 
are different for pension and healthcare programs. Moreover, pensions are for old age; health 
care needs are for life. There are linkages between healthcare and pension programs, 
however, for example in the collection of contributions, administrative and record keeping 
activities, which may contribute towards savings in total resource costs. 
It is also useful to regard healthcare and pensions as a bundle of goods and services that the 
elderly will need to consume. This bundle of services represents a significant share of national 
income (up to 20% in OECD countries). How this bundle of services is financed and organized 
could not only impact on the adequacy of current healthcare and pension arrangements, but 
on other important areas as well. For example, better coordination between the two programs 
                                               
1 In 2010, the population aged over 60 was 9.9% of the total population, lower than the corresponding share 
globally of 11.0%. However by 2030, Asia’s share at 16.7% is projected to exceed that of the world (16.5%). 
Similar trends are projected for the median age of the population. Life expectancy at birth in Asia is expected to 
increase from 70.3 in 2010 to 73.6 in 2030, with many Asia-Pacific countries exhibiting much higher levels 
(UNDESA 2010). There are, however, significant variations around these averages in various countries, so broad 
averages alone should not guide policies. 




could facilitate social security for migrant workers, strengthen social safety nets, and positively 
impact economic growth.  
In many Asian countries, this bundle of services needed by the elderly is organized and 
delivered on an ad-hoc basis under the responsibility of various government agencies and 
departments with only limited coordination between them. This paper argues that the 
fragmented nature of healthcare and pension programs increases the total resource costs of 
financing the bundle of services. 
As countries in Asia are heterogeneous in terms of income levels, economic and political 
structures, institutional development, state capacities, demographic characteristics, and 
existing pension and healthcare systems, this paper does not aim to provide a blueprint for 
policy coordination between healthcare and pension arrangements. Rather, it explores the 
various avenues of coordination that are feasible with a view to minimizing the combined 
resource costs devoted to managing ageing. 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the rationale for policy coordination 
between healthcare and pension arrangements. This is followed in chapter 3 by a discussion 
of the areas where coordination between pension and healthcare policies may be feasible. 
Selected case studies from Asia involving such coordination are discussed in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 concludes. 
2. THE RATIONALE FOR POLICY COORDINATION 
There are several reasons why exploring the feasibility of greater coordination between 
pension and healthcare merits consideration. 
First, the combined expenditure on these two services is large, implying significant potential 
savings through better coordination. Table 1 provides data on social sector expenditure in 
OECD countries for 2007. The data suggests that such expenditure averaged 19.26% of gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2007, with a wide range of 28.4% in France to 7.21% in Mexico. 
The OECD average for the public pension and health care expenditure to GDP ratio was 
12.82, ranging from 19.97 for France to 4.03% for Mexico.  
In Asian countries, public resources devoted to pensions and healthcare programs are lower 
than in the OECD countries.  The average public expenditure on healthcare programs was 
2.6% of GDP (WHO 2009), and public expenditure on pension programs is estimated to 
increase from 3% in 1990 to 10% in 2050 (ADB 2006). For the same period, private 
expenditure on healthcare and pensions as a share of GDP was 2.5% and 2.1%, respectively, 
of GDP. However, even these figures suggest a potential for significant resource savings from 
better coordination. 




Table 1: Social Sector Expenditure by Governments in OECD Countries 
(% Share of GDP, 2007) 

















OECD 7.00 5.82 3.93 2.51 19.26 
France 12.48 7.49 4.58 3.85 28.40 
Sweden 7.18 6.60 5.58 7.97 27.33 
Germany 10.71 7.86 3.96 2.63 25.16 
Italy 14.05 6.65 2.77 1.39 24.86 
United 
Kingdom 
5.38 6.85 4.55 3.76 20.54 
Netherlands 4.74 5.98 5.38 3.97 20.08 
Czech 
Republic 
7.42 5.76 4.37 1.24 18.79 
Japan 9.77 6.30 1.59 1.05 18.70 
Canada 4.19 7.01 2.46 3.20 16.86 
United 
States 
5.96 7.23 2.02 0.99 16.20 
Australia 3.36 5.74 4.01 2.90 16.02 
Chile 5.15 3.66 0.88 0.88 10.56 
Turkey 6.12 4.10 0.14 0.11 10.48 
Republic of 
Korea 
1.69 3.50 0.83 1.51 7.53 
Mexico 1.38 2.65 0.90 2.28 
7.21 
Source: OECD (2010) 
From the perspective of the economy as a whole, the relationship between pensions and 
healthcare costs is a complex one. In many countries, including the rapidly growing economies 
of the PRC, India, and Indonesia, the incidence of lifestyle diseases is growing and these 
diseases are affecting the working age population at a younger age. Despite possible savings 
on pension costs due to higher numbers or premature deaths resulting from lifestyle diseases, 
the resulting loss in productivity to the economy and the rise in healthcare costs due to lifestyle 
diseases could outweigh any such savings2
Better management of healthcare expenditure through “healthy ageing”, also increases the 
real value of pension income. For example, while controlling healthcare expenditure may be 
. This is ultimately an empirical question, which has 
not so far been extensively researched in Asian countries.  
                                               
2 In most countries, health care costs are rising at a faster rate than GDP per capita. The Economist (2011) reports 
that in the past forty years (roughly from 1970 to 2010), healthcare spending in the US rose at an annual rate of 
4.9%, but annual growth of GDP per capita was only 2.1%. This is unsustainable—if it were to continue, by 2065 
the US would be spending 100% of GDP on healthcare. 




difficult due to the stochastic nature of illnesses, better managing healthcare expenditure 
through leading healthier lifestyles, preventive care,  and a more sophisticated understanding 
of the human body may also increase purchasing power during the retirement period. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, more effective use of primary care and secondary care through 
“gate-keepers” also reduces healthcare expenditure. 
The second reason concerns the potential for better coordination to mitigate the adverse 
impact of ageing on economic growth. It is now widely accepted that population ageing will 
tend to lower labor-force availability and savings rates, thereby raising concerns about a future 
slowing of economic growth. Bloom et al. (2010) estimate that OECD countries are likely to 
see modest declines in the rate of economic growth as their populations age. However, they 
argue that greater female labor force participation and gradually extending the institutional 
retirement age can partially mitigate the economic consequences of an older population. In 
many Asian countries, declining fertility rates will cause labor-force-to-population ratios to rise 
as the shrinking share of young people will more than offset the skewing of adults towards the 
older ages (Bloom et al. 2010). These factors suggest that population ageing may not 
significantly impede the pace of economic growth in developing countries, if appropriate 
policies are institutionalized.  
Robust and sustained economic growth is crucial to ensure that pension and healthcare 
promises remain credible, and that social security programs are fiscally sustainability (Barr and 
Diamond 2008). Coordinated social security funding (including healthcare and pensions), if 
intermediated through financial and capital markets, could boost national savings and 
investments, and stimulate economic growth. This is an example of a policy response that 
could help mitigate the adverse impact of ageing on economic growth discussed earlier.  
Further, domestic policy responses, such as increasing the institutional retirement age, need to 
be implemented gradually as they have important implications for labor markets, as well as for 
consumption, savings, and economic growth. The decision to exit the labor market and retire is 
based in part on an individual’s current and future healthcare and retirement financing 
arrangements. To the extent these arrangements impact on an individual’s decision to exit the 
labor market, policy coordination can help facilitate such a transition, and also enable progress 
in aligning the average effective retirement age with the official retirement age. Among the 
OECD countries, while in Japan and the Republic of Korea the effective retirement age for 
men and women is higher than the official age, the opposite is the case in Germany, Australia, 
and the Netherlands (Roy 2011—exhibit 16). 
The third reason is that such coordination can help facilitate the extension of social security 
coverage, and strengthen social safety nets. Currently, social safety nets in many Asian 
countries comprise of ad-hoc programs run by different government agencies, departments, 
and statutory boards with only limited coordination between them. For example in India, the 
Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Rural Development, and the Ministry 
of Finance are involved in providing for healthcare financing, retirement security, 




unemployment insurance, and work guarantee programs with limited coordination in terms of 
targeting of beneficiaries, administrative, and record-keeping activities. Coordination would 
help improve coverage, and eliminate duplication of efforts by multiple government agencies 
and programs.  
The fourth reason is that both pension and healthcare programs are affected by changing 
demographic patterns, particularly advances in longevity. Income and healthcare expenditure 
are positively related and healthcare expenditure increases disproportionately with rising 
longevity. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between life expectancy and per capita healthcare 
expenditure in OECD countries in 1975 and 2000. Data from OECD countries suggest that 
health expenditure for an individual aged above 65 is four times that of an individual aged 15–
64 and eight times higher for the old-old age group (OECD 2006). Takayama’s (2011) estimate 
of health expenditure being 4.8 times higher for an individual aged above 65, using 
disaggregated age-specific health expenditure data from Japan, corroborates the OECD 
findings. The disproportionate increase in per capita healthcare expenditure is due to the 
combined impact of increasing cost of healthcare services associated with innovations in 
science and medical technology and the greater use of medical treatment as people age. 
Figure 1: Per Capita Life Expectancy and Healthcare Expenditure in OECD Countries 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the average time spent in retirement since 1960. In 1960, the average male 
in OECD countries spent about 13 years in retirement, and the average female spent about 17 
years. By 2010, this had increased to 18 years and 23 years, respectively. Forecasts from the 
United Nations and OECD suggest that at current retirement ages, by 2050 this will increase to 
21 and 25, respectively, so the time spent in retirement has been increasing. It is evident that 
the increases in retirement age have not kept pace with increases in longevity.  




Figure 2: Life Expectancy at Pensionable age (1960–2050)  
 
Source: OECD (2011) 
The observations in Figures 1 and 2 have important implications for financing healthcare and 
pension expenditure. Coordination between healthcare and pension policies and programs can 
enable governments to better address the economic costs of advances in longevity.  
Fifth, better coordination can facilitate provision of social security benefits for migrant workers. 
Flows of migrant workers across geographical borders in Asian countries and from outside the 
region have increased with globalization and greater integration of countries in the global 
economy. However, migrant workers in most countries are not required to contribute to social 
security programs of the recipient country, or in their country of origin (e.g., Singapore and 
Malaysia). There has been an increased recognition by policymakers, and greater effort in 
some countries such as India, Philippines, and Japan to extend social security coverage for 
migrant workers using Totalization Agreements3
                                               
3 Totalization agreements are similar to double taxation treaties, and ensure that individuals do not pay social 
security taxes or contributions in more than one jurisdiction, or alternatively avoid paying them all together. These 
agreements also help fill gaps in benefits levels of individuals who have worked for significant periods of time in 
multiple countries. 
 or bilateral agreements similar to Double Tax 
Treaties. Coordination between healthcare and pension programs—especially on collecting 
contributions, and investment management of migrant workers’ contributions—would ensure 
that the migrant worker has continued social security protection. For example, without 
coordination a host country would have to negotiate separate agreements with the pension 
program (under Ministry of Labor in most countries), with the healthcare program (under the 
Ministry of Health), and other social security programs. Coordination could reduce the 
transaction cost of totalization agreements. 




Further, as countries move away from defined benefit to defined contribution type of retirement 
schemes, the density of contributions4
Lastly, coordination between programs could assist in better public financial management. In 
many countries health and pension programs are organized or financed by the state. Individual 
contributions to these programs are thus equivalent to a tax on wage income, and have similar 
equity and efficiency implications any income tax. Considering the equity or efficiency 
implications of a particular tax (or revenue) to finance a particular program (or expenditure) is 
not entirely useful
 of each individual to healthcare and retirement financing 
programs becomes increasingly important. Coordination can also help facilitate higher density 
of contributions through totalization agreements for migrant workers.  
5, as it is the combined incidence of all taxes6
An increase in the contribution rate by either SHI program or the public pension program 
singularly, without policy coordination between the two, would divert disproportionate 
resources towards a particular activity (either healthcare or pensions in this case). When either 
program is contemplating increasing the contribution rate, the combined contribution rate of 
8% has important implications, and not only the contribution rates of the individual programs 
(2% and 6%, respectively). This is because it is the same base on which contributions are 
levied. Thus, increases in contribution rates to either of the programs will reduce the total 
resources available to finance other programs. It is only with policy coordination that 
appropriate trade-offs between various competing priorities and programs can be achieved.  
 that matters. Extending the 
argument to healthcare and pension programs suggests that there is a strong case for policy 
coordination. For example, consider a hypothetical country which requires members to 
contribute 2% of their wage income to the social health insurance (SHI) program, and 6% of 
their wage income to a public pension program, amounting to a combined contribution rate of 
8%.  
                                               
4The density of contributions refers to the actual contributions made to the healthcare or pension fund by an 
individual divided by the potential maximum number of contributions throughout the life span. The density of 
contributions impacts the adequacy of the benefit level in pure defined contribution pension programs; and the 
incentives to contribute in healthcare programs.  
5 The effectiveness of earmarked taxes to finance a particular program is still debated. Many have considered it to 
be an efficient source, as it increases accountability and ensures a certain source of revenue is matched with 
certain expenditure. But such an arrangement also reduces the fiscal flexibility of the state and promotes the 
formation of advocacy coalitions and interest groups associated with certain public expenditure programs. 
6 Incidence of taxation refers to who ultimately pays the tax. Economic theory suggests that the incidence of 
taxation is determined by the elasticities of demand and supply. In evaluating the equity and efficiency of taxes 
the combined incidence of taxes are important because different taxes have different allocative and distributional 
affects (Musgrave 1959).  In social security programs, as it is the same base that is being taxed (wage income), 
the combined incidence of all social security taxes play an important role.  




Contribution rates to a range of social security programs for selected Asian countries are 
shown in Table 2. The contribution rates to retirement financing and associated programs 
range from 6% to nearly 30% of an individual’s wage income, while contributions for all social 
security programs (including healthcare and unemployment insurance) range from 9.2% to 
40%7
                                               
7 The base on which the contribution is levied also varies widely between the sample countries. 
. So contribution rates of social security programs vary widely between Asian countries. 
This wide range further underscores the importance of policy coordination between various 
social security programs (healthcare and pension programs accounting for a significant share) 
within countries being levied on the same base, i.e., wage income. 




Table 2: Contribution Rates to Social Security Programs in Selected Countries 
Economy 
Contribution Rates for Pensions, 
Disability, and Survivors’ Programs 
 
Contribution Rates for All Social 
Security Programs 
Insured person Employer Total Insured person Employer Total 
Brunei 
Darussalam 8.5 8.5 17.0  8.5 8.5  17.0 
PRC  8.0 20.0 28.0 11.0 29.0  40.0  
Hong Kong, 
China  5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 10.0 
  
India  12.0 17.6 29.6 13.8 22.4 36.1 
Indonesia 2.0 4.0 6.0 2.0 7.2  9.2 
Japan  7.9 7.9 15.7 13.1 13.8 26.9  
Malaysia  11.5 12.5  24.0  11.5 13.8 25.3 
Philippines  2.3 7.07  10.4  4.6 8.3  12.9 
Singapore  20.0 15.0  35.0  20.0 15.0  35.0 
Republic of 
Korea  
4.5 4.5 9.0 7.8 8.7 16.5 
Sri Lanka 8.0 12.0 20.0 8.0 12.0 20.0 
Taipei,China 1.3 10.6 11.9 2.9 14.5 17.4 
Thailand  3.4 3.4 6.9 5.0 5.2 10.2 
Viet Nam  6.0 12.0 18.0 8.5 20.0 28.5 
Source: Estimated from Official Reports; SSA (2010) 
3. AREAS OF COORDINATION 
The previous chapter discussed the rationale for greater coordination in healthcare and 
pension programs. This chapter discusses the various possible areas for coordination in 
healthcare and pension programs.  




3.1 Coordination in Collection of Contributions 
There are two basic models for organizing public pensions—the social insurance model and 
the benefit payment model (Ross 2011). The social insurance model handles all major 
functions including the collection of contributions and the distribution of benefits to members. 
These are found in France, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Japan, and Thailand, for example. The 
benefit payment model relies on the tax administration system for the collection of member 
contributions, but pays beneficiaries directly. Examples of such arrangements are found in the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia. The investment function 
in this model is either handled in-house such as in Sweden, or is sourced to another 
organization such as the Treasury Department in the United States. 
The collection of contributions runs parallel to the tax administration system in the social 
insurance model, and is integrated with the tax administration system in the benefit payment 
model. Ross (2011: 6–7) argues, “historically in Western Europe parallel systems developed, 
but in other places integrated collection systems have always prevailed, as in the United 
States, America and Australia. In these countries social insurance institutions developed later 
and could effectively use established tax collection systems”. 
Similarly, for public healthcare programs there are two broad models—the social insurance 
model and the benefit payment model. However, the types of social insurance or benefit 
payment models that countries use to finance healthcare plans differ widely. These relate to 
whether the social insurance model delivers healthcare services directly or through a network 
of contracted providers; or whether there is a single healthcare fund or competing funds that 
individuals can choose from (The Netherlands) or are assigned to (Japan) 
Predictably, a parallel collection system is more expensive, as integrated collection systems 
have lower administrative costs (Ross 2011). In Singapore; Malaysia; and Hong Kong, China 
the provident fund collects the combined contributions for both healthcare and pension 
programs; while two separate organizations collect healthcare and pension contributions in the 
Philippines. The Republic of Korea recently integrated the collection of contributions to the 
healthcare and pension programs. Contributions had been collected separately, but since 2011 
contributions to both programs have been collected by the National Health Insurance 
Corporation (NHIC), which is also given the responsibility for administrative and record-
keeping activities of both programs. A combined, centralized collection of healthcare and 
pension contributions allows savings in administrative costs, either through the established tax 
system or through the organization managing the programs8
                                               
8 The extent to which cost savings can be realized in various countries when centralized collection methods are 
used is an empirical question, and has not received attention in the literature. 
. 




3.2 Coordination of Administrative Functions, Data, and Record-
keeping Activities 
Social security organizations can realize considerable economies of scale through coordination 
of administrative functions, particularly in data and record-keeping activities. A centralized 
collection system and record-keeping activities reduces transactions cost, and most 
importantly eliminates wasteful expenditure on duplication of services. Further, such 
coordination facilitates totalization agreements and portability of pension and healthcare 
benefits.  
3.3 Coordination in Investment Management 
An important question that needs to be addressed in this context is whether it is efficient to 
have single or multiple competing funds for public healthcare and public pension programs. 
Another question is whether a case can be made for a combined healthcare and pension fund, 
especially if both funds have the same investment mandate and are subject to statutory 
requirements on the degrees of exposure to different asset classes.  
The standard argument in favor of multiple funds is that it reduces the monopoly power of each 
fund, promotes competition which forces funds to reduce their administrative costs, and 
reduces systemic risk 9
A related issue is whether investments in healthcare and pension funds should be undertaken 
jointly. There has been only limited research on this issue. Both pension and healthcare funds 
have different liability structures, and the variance in benefit payments, in both defined 
. This argument, however, is based on the assumption that members of 
the healthcare or pension program have the freedom to choose between competing funds. 
Moreover, if funds are required to have similar investment mandates or exposure to different 
asset classes there may be little effective competition as each is constrained by regulation and 
will offer similar returns. If, however, fund managers are allowed to compete by offering 
packages that differ in some dimensions, the choice and competition will give funds an 
incentive to be cost effective, and increases economic efficiency. This is not the case in 
healthcare and pension plans in most Asian countries. Individuals do not have the option of 
selecting from competing multiple funds; in most countries, there is a separate health 
insurance fund and a separate pension fund that manages their respective assets and 
liabilities.   
                                               
9 Pension and healthcare systems are affected by macroeconomic, demographic, technology, labor market, and 
financial shocks. Each of these could, individually or collectively, undermine the viability of the pension or 
healthcare system by increasing the risk faced. Diversification and increased competition amongst fund 
managers reduces systemic risk in the healthcare or pension systems.  




contribution and defined benefit pension programs, is arguably smaller than the variance in 
payments in healthcare funds. This is due to the stochastic nature of illnesses and the 
uncertainty about the cost of treatment. While it is indeed difficult to accurately project the 
liabilities in pension funds, especially due to rapidly changing demographic profiles and 
advances in longevity, it is arguably easier to estimate the expected expenditure of pension 
plans than that of healthcare plans. It can be argued that the difference in the liability 
structures between healthcare and pension programs would impact the investment decisions 
of their respective funds. This then implies that there is a case to consider separate investment 
management of healthcare and pension funds.  
3.4 Coordination of Tax Treatment 
The tax treatment of retirement and healthcare financing instruments need to be coordinated to 
ensure equitable tax treatment for providers of such instruments and among the instruments. 
In many economies including India, Singapore, and Thailand tax treatment for many retirement 
and healthcare financing instruments, and their providers varies considerably. This results in 
significantly differing relative prices for different instruments; and in differing advantages to 
providers. This affects contemporaneous and temporal decisions that individuals make 
regarding consumption and savings.  
Transitioning to more equitable treatment however poses challenges including securing 
political consensus for the tax changes. Transition costs and their management would impact 
on the pace and extent to which such coordination is feasible.   
3.5 Intra Program Coordination 
Not only is there a strong case for policy coordination amongst healthcare and pension 
programs, but also among various healthcare programs on the one hand, and among various 
pension products or programs on the other. The reasoning is as follows. 
There is consensus amongst pension and social security practitioners and experts that the 
replacement rates10
                                               
10 The Replacement Rate is the ratio of income post-retirement to the last drawn salary of the pensioner. 
 (from all sources of income during the retirement period) should be about 
60%, to protect against longevity, inflation, and survivors’ risks (OECD 2011). As individuals 
will rely on multiple instruments, retirement products, or pension programs to achieve this 
replacement rate, there is a case for policy coordination among the various instruments made 
available (provident fund, social insurance, social pensions, capital and financial market 
products, annuities, etc.) to the pensioner to ensure that the total resource costs devoted are 
minimized.  




The case for policy coordination amongst various healthcare programs is more complex. This 
is because of inherent market failures, and to a lesser extent the government failures regarding 
the provision and delivery of healthcare services (Blomqvist 2011). While some healthcare 
services have characteristics of public goods (immunization, vaccination programs, etc.), most 
healthcare services are private goods. Further, the market for healthcare services is 
characterized by information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, etc.; there is thus a 
role for the state in the provision of healthcare services, and to also minimize the impact of 
market failures in healthcare11
As individuals may rely on both public and private programs for healthcare protection, 
coordination and regulation among various healthcare programs (public and private) will help 
minimize the total resource costs devoted to financing healthcare. Such coordination manifests 
itself in controlling the supply of beds (public and private) across all levels of speciality care 
(primary, secondary, and tertiary) in particular areas. Two competing speciality hospitals 
serving a small geographical location may be efficient in a narrow technical sense, but 
inefficient from a broader societal resource cost perspective.  
.  
Most social security programs have an element of workman’s compensation that relates to 
healthcare benefits for an employee in the event of a work-related injury or accident. This is 
typically provided for with the pension program—including collection of contribution, investment 
management, and administrative functions. The healthcare component of the workman’s 
compensation runs parallel to existing national health program, and could be integrated. In 
most cases, the instrument used to finance the healthcare component of workman’s 
compensation, and the healthcare program is a form of social insurance (example: Philippines, 
Viet Nam, and India).  
The above discussion suggests that not only macro-level coordination between healthcare and 
pension policies is needed, but that coordination among different components of pension and 
health systems are also essential. 
3.6 Coordination in Design of Healthcare and Pension Program 
The design of the healthcare and pension program is an area that has received only limited 
attention in the literature, but has important fiscal implications as they can give rise to 
contingent liabilities. For example, if the pension guarantee made by the state takes into 
account rising healthcare costs so as to ensure that real pension income does not fall, and if 
this is done without coordination with the arrangements within the health program to address 
cost inflation, the total guarantee given by the state will be sub-optimal. If the net guarantees 
(both healthcare and pensions) are too high they will give rise to contingent liabilities. The net 
                                               
11 For example, this can be accomplished by reducing the ability of a healthcare provider to exploit its information 
advantage. 




guarantees could also be too low in the absence of coordination. The example of coordination 
with respect to healthcare cost inflation is an example of only one of the various elements in 
the design of healthcare and pension programs. There are other areas that impact the design 
of both healthcare and pension programs, such as benefit levels, net replacement rate, and 
retirement age.  
4. COUNTRY EXAMPLES 
The previous Chapter discussed the rationale for greater coordination between healthcare and 
pension programs, and envisaged the different types of possible coordination between the two. 
This chapter provides a broad overview of existing coordination mechanisms in selected Asian 
countries—the Philippines, Thailand, Viet Nam, India, Singapore, and Malaysia.  
4.1 Philippines 
In the Philippines, the state pension program is administered by the Social Security System 
(SSS) and governed by the Social Security Commission. A separate, state-owned corporation, 
Phil Health, which is governed by the Department of Health, administers the healthcare 
program. Contributions to both programs are deducted from an individual’s payroll, shared by 
the employer and employee, and credited to SSS and PhilHealth respectively12
4.2 Viet Nam 
. Both the SSS 
and PhilHealth have similar investment mandates, and exposure to asset classes, but their 
respective investment and cash management functions are carried out separately. The 
administrative arrangements for both programs, including record keeping and processing 
claims, appear to have only limited coordination as they are housed in separate organizations  
and are supported by different institutions. 
In Viet Nam, Viet Nam Social Security (VSS) administers the state pension and healthcare 
program. It falls under the purview of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs 
(MoLISA) and the Ministry of Finance. Contributions to the pension program and the health 
care program are deducted from an individual’s payroll, and in addition to employer 
contributions, they are credited to respective healthcare and pension funds. Both funds have 
similar investment mandates comprising of exposure to treasury bills, government bonds, and 
money market instruments. The VSS handles investment and cash management of both 
programs. Prior to the implementation of “Circular 21” if either program accounts ran out of 
                                               
12 Contributions for some members are subsidized by the state, or are paid annually—for example the members of 
the Overseas Worker Program are required to pay annual contributions.  




funds (the healthcare program has been accruing deficits since 2005), benefits could be paid 
from the surpluses accrued in other program accounts. Circular 21 envisages greater 
accountability of the programs for meeting their liabilities, and requires program deficits to be 
financed by government budgets rather than from accrued surpluses of other social security 
programs.  
While there is centralized collection of contributions, and the investment function is carried out 
in-house by the VSS, the healthcare and pension funds are invested separately. Allowing a 
program fund to go into deficit to use accumulated reserves from other funds implicitly 
defeated the purpose of separate investment and cash management of the programs. There 
appears to be policy coordination between the two programs with respect to changes in the 
contribution rates. The Social Insurance Law, which governs the pension arrangements, was 
implemented before the Health Insurance Law in 2007, but any increases in contribution rates 
are synchronized between the two programs.  
4.3 Singapore 
In Singapore, state healthcare and pension programs are administered by the Central 
Provident Fund, a statutory board under the Ministry of Manpower. Contributions to healthcare 
and pension program are deducted from an individual’s payroll, shared by the employer and 
employee, and channeled to medical savings account “Medisave”, and another account to 
finance retirement expenditure13
For the purpose of investment management, CPF does differentiate between balances held 
accumulated in Medisave or other accounts of a member
.  
14
CPF also offers a health insurance plan called Medishield which is used for in-patient 
treatment at restructured hospitals. More generous versions of Medishield were privatized in 
2005 to National Trade Union Congress (NTUC). Since then many private insurance 
companies have been offering top-up plans to the basic Medishield scheme. Premiums to 
most healthcare schemes in Singapore (public and private) can be financed from a member’s 
Medisave account but they need to be approved by the CPF Board. To that extent, there is 
coordination amongst the various healthcare schemes in terms of their financing 
arrangements.  
. A significant share of CPF 
balances are held in non-marketable Government of Singapore bonds, and members earn a 
pre-determined interest rate on their balances.  
Singapore’s healthcare and pension arrangements provide an example of various aspects of 
coordination. Though the program is not administered by the Ministry of Health, and is under 
                                               
13 CPF also has mandatory contributions to finance housing expenditure, but these are not discussed in this paper. 
Asher and Nandy (2006) provide an analysis of the CPF system. 
14 The investment management of Medishield, discussed below, is carried out separately from that of Medisave. 




the purview of the Ministry of Manpower, there is implicit policy coordination in the contribution 
rates to healthcare and pension program. This is reflected in the many occasions on which the 
CPF has changed its overall combined contribution rate to both programs, particularly during 
periods of economic crisis to reduce the immediate burden on employers. There is 
coordination in collection of contributions, and its investment by the CPF. The CPF system is 
intricately linked with the tax administration system, which also reduces the marginal efficiency 
cost of funds (of tax revenue). 
Most importantly, the administration, record-keeping, and data processing functions for both 
programs are handled by the CPF itself. It is assumed that this allows them to realize 
considerable cost-savings due to economies of scale. As CPF has access to disaggregated 
and policy-relevant data on various aspects of healthcare and pension arrangements, this can 
bring a unique systemic perspective in social security planning and reform15
4.4 Malaysia 
.  
Malaysia too relies on a mandatory provident fund, the Employers Provident Fund (EPF) to 
administer its healthcare and pension programs. It also allows members to use the EPF to 
finance housing and education. Contributions to the EPF are shared by employer and 
employee, and are parked in three separate accounts to pay for housing, pensions, and 
healthcare expenditure respectively. The EPF does not distinguish between the accounts for 
investment purposes. Member balances are invested in Malaysian government securities, real 
estate, money market products, and equity instruments. As withdrawals from healthcare 
account amounted to less than 0.5% of all EPF withdrawals, in 2007 the healthcare account 
was dismantled. Member contributions following 2007 reforms are now channeled to two 
accounts: housing (Account I) and pensions (Account II). Malaysia does not have a national 
health plan, but allows members to pay for certain healthcare expenses from their balances in 
EPF. Those employed in the formal sector, however, are part of a compulsory work injury 
scheme.  
The Social Security Organization (SOCSO), initially established as a government department 
in 1971 and later converted into a Statutory Board, administers an employment injury health 
insurance scheme and an invalidity pension scheme. Contributions to SOCSO are deducted 
from the individual’s payroll (1.25%). Employers are also required to contribute to both 
programs (1.0%). Contributions for both programs are invested in Government of Malaysia 
securities, private debt securities, and money market instruments. SOCSO appears to have a 
                                               
15 Social security has multiple objectives which include consumption smoothening, poverty relief, income 
redistribution, amongst many others. Social security programs, including healthcare and pensions, are impacted 
by underlying macroeconomic, demographic, and labor market trends. Thus, when discussing any aspect of 
social security, it is important to consider a systemic perspective and not view a particular program in isolation or 
insular from the economic paradigm (Barr and Diamond 2008). 




more conservative investment mandate than its counterpart the EPF. There appears to be only 
limited coordination between the two organizations administering healthcare and pension 
programs in Malaysia. EPF and SOCSO have a common membership so administrative 
coordination could potentially cut administrative costs. 
4.5 Thailand 
Thailand’s healthcare system is administered by three organizations—the National Health 
Security Office, the Ministry of Public Health, and the Social Security Office (SSO) which 
administers pension arrangements.  
Currently, there are three healthcare schemes—one for formal sector workers, one for civil 
servants, and a Universal Coverage (UC) scheme which covers the entire population. The UC 
scheme, implemented in 2001, superseded many complex healthcare programs for those 
employed in the informal sector. The social insurance program covers around 8%, the civil 
service program another 8%, and the remaining population are covered by the UC Scheme. 
The three programs are administered by separate organizations, with limited policy 
coordination between them. 
The UC and civil service schemes are tax-financed, and have no user fees or co-insurance 
rates. The social insurance program is administered by the SSO, which also administers the 
pension program. Contributions to both the social insurance and pension program are 
deducted from an individual’s payroll, shared by the employer and the employee, and credited 
to separate funds in the SSO. SSO hires professional investment and fund managers to invest 
these funds. The funds have similar investment and asset class exposure requirements, and 
earn similar returns on investments.  
Policymakers have made repeated attempts to harmonize the three health schemes, to 
combine administrative and record keeping functions, but have been thwarted by powerful 
interest groups that benefit from keeping the programs separate16
4.6 India 
. As the social insurance 
program covers less than 8% of the population and paid for only 6% of total health expenditure 
in 2009, the overall impact of existing coordination between healthcare and pensions programs 
administered by the SSO is relatively small. 
Healthcare and pension arrangements are administered by multiple organizations with limited 
regulatory supervision in India. The healthcare program is administered the Employees State 
Insurance Corporation (ESIC) enacted under the Employee State Insurance Act of 1948 which 
                                               
16 The social insurance scheme and the civil service scheme offer their members relatively more generous benefits 
than the UC scheme (Ramesh 2009). 




is headed by the minister of labor, and is a contributory program for those employed in the 
formal sector. Contributions are collected from an individual’s payroll and are channeled to an 
insurance fund. Members and their dependents are entitled to receive treatment at ESIC 
hospitals or at approved private hospitals.  
There are other health insurance and community schemes such as Rashtriya Swasthya Bima 
Yojna (RSBY), the Chiranjeevi maternal healthcare scheme, and the National Rural Health 
Mission (NRHM), amongst many others. But there is no policy coordination between these 
various schemes in terms of infrastructure utilization, coverage, and targeting mechanisms.  
The Employees Provident Fund Organization (EPFO), established under the EPF Act of 1952, 
administers the pension program—a defined contribution employee’s provident fund (EPF) and 
a defined benefit pension scheme (EPS). Contributions to the EPFO are collected from an 
individual’s payroll, and are shared by the employer and employee. Member balances are 
invested predominantly in public sector debt investments and members are credited a pre-
determined interest rate which has not significantly fluctuated (Asher 2008)  
There are other voluntary pension programs—such as the New Pension Scheme (NPS) and 
tax-advantage savings schemes such as the Public Provident Fund (PPF)—and micro-pension 
schemes that are also administered by different departments. However, there is limited policy 
coordination and regulatory oversight of the various pension schemes. This is reflected in the 
uneven tax treatment between various pension programs. The Pension Fund Regulatory and 
Development Authority (PFRDA) Bill, which seeks to set up regulatory authority governing the 
NPS is yet to be passed by the Parliament.  
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Rapid ageing of the population globally represents an unprecedented historical trend. As 
pension and healthcare costs are positively correlated with rising incomes, ageing, 
urbanization, and a shift from communicable to life-style diseases, managing these costs is a 
major challenge. 
As there are many linkages between healthcare and pension arrangements—in terms of costs, 
exposure to risks, and as they jointly impact on crucial policy decisions—this paper discusses 
the rationale for coordination between various programs to better manage the cost of ageing. 
The current difficult macroeconomic environment, including fiscal stringency conditions, 
strengthens the case for such coordination.  
Ultimately, healthcare and pensions is a bundle of services that the elderly would need to have 
access to. It is also clear that the share of resources devoted to financing this bundle of service 
will continue to increase as people live longer and have better access to healthcare services. 
The extent to which coordination between healthcare and pension arrangements enables 




countries to minimize these resource costs, suggests it could be a helpful way to better 
manage the costs of ageing. 
An avenue not explored in this paper, are possible alternative solutions to the provision and 
delivery of this bundle of services, and to manage costs of ageing. As many Asian countries 
have limited fiscal space to finance social expenditure, innovative solutions relying on the state 
and the market in the provision and delivery of the bundle of services merit consideration.  
Greater research on the various economic and social linkages underpinning healthcare and 
pension arrangements also needs to be explored in country-specific contexts. This would 
require greater research, availability of robust disaggregated data on demographic and 
macroeconomic variables.  
The country examples in this paper provided a broad overview of the various types of 
coordination mechanisms in place between healthcare and pension arrangements. As the 
sample countries have differing economic, social, and political institutions, and are in various 
stages of demographic transition, there are no blue-prints for perfectly coordinated healthcare 
and pension systems. Coordination between healthcare and pension programs should 
ultimately minimize total resource costs devoted by a society to managing healthcare and 
pension programs.  
To give impetus to such coordination it would be useful to initiate national and sub-regional 
forums for exchange of ideas and practices so that network externalities can be realized. 
Multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the World Health Organization could 
play a role by considering greater internal coordination between those responsible for pension 
and healthcare, and initiating communication among them about how to better coordinate 
pension and healthcare policies. Their insights can be then incorporated in their policy advice 
and research output on these issues. 
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